NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 30 | Number 4

Article 7

6-1-1952

Automobiles -- Evidence -- Use of Radar
Speedmeter
J. Kenneth Lee

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. K. Lee, Automobiles -- Evidence -- Use of Radar Speedmeter, 30 N.C. L. Rev. 385 (1952).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol30/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-vidence-Use of Radar Speedmeter
Several cities' have recently2 begun using a radar device commonly
called the "Whammy" 3 to aid in obtaining evidence to secure convictions
of speeding motorists.4 The introduction of this device was greeted with
conflicting opinions by North Carolinians 5 but 100% convictions have
6
been obtained where this evidence was relied upon for conviction.
A brief explanation of the history and operation of the radar speedmeter may be helpful in weighing the legal questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence obtained by its use. The machine utilizes the
principle of "pulse radar" for its operation. Although active work was
' For a list of early users of the radar speedmeter, see MuNiciPA. L. J., Feb.,
1951, p. 11.
2The radar speedmeter was first introduced in North Carolina in 1950 when
the City of Greensboro purchased one unit and used it for a period of one year
solely for the purpose of making speed checks or counts on major thoroughfares
and in school zones. Letter to writer from Jeter L. Williamson, Chief of Police,
Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952.
' Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 8, 1952, p. 2, col. 6.
'The evidence obtained by the use of the radar speedmeter is used in local
recorders or municipal courts to obtain convictions in Durham (The Durham (N.
C.) Sun, April 15, 1952 §B, p. 1, col. 5), Raleigh (Raleigh (N. C.) News and
Observer, March 28, 1952, §1, p. 18), Greensboro (letter to writer from Jeter L.
Williamson, Chief of Police, Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952) and possibly
others. The admisison of this evidence has been justified in practice by having
the local judge observe and certify the machine as acceptable. Greensboro (N. C.)
Daily News, Aug. 19, 1951, §4, p. 1, col. 1; Raleigh (N. C.) News and Observer,
March 28, 1952, §1, p. 18; Address by Hon. Ralph L. Custer, Mayor of Garden
City, N. Y., at the N. Y. State Mayors Conference in Syracuse, June 14, 1949,
p. 3. Some city officials, however, have expressly admitted that they proceed on
the more utilitarian theory that victims will pay the fine rather than appeal the
case to courts of last resort to test the validity of the evidence. N. Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 4
' State newspapers have taken various attitudes toward the "Whammy." One
view is illustrated by an editorial stating that "A battalion of Whammies. ...
ought to be set out on North Carolina highways to do their stuff. If they
reduce the speed of cars . . . . they will reduce the state's toll of death, injury
and destruction." Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, Nov. 12, 1951; the opposite
view is illustrated by an editorial labeling the device as a "speed trap." This
paper predicts that "as an aid to traffic safety it will prove a colossal flop. But
as a method to antagonize the public it undoubtedly will be a big success." Durham (N. C.) Sun, May 21, 1951. For an expression of the conflicting opinions
of several citizens who witnessed a demonstration of the "Whammy," see The
Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 15, 1952, §B, p. 1, col. 5.
Greensboro, N. C.: arrests through March 20, 1952, approximately 400 with
100% convictions, see note 2 supra; Winston-Salem, N. C.: 55 arrests and 55
convictions, letter to writer from John M. Gold, City Manager, Winston-Salem,
N. C., March 26, 1952; Raleigh, N. C.: 2 cases prior to April 8, 1952, and 2 convictions, Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 8, 1952, p. 2, col. 6.
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begun on pulse radar at the Naval Research Laboratory in 1934, 7 the
earliest success was achieved in 1939, when a radar set was given exhaustive tests during battle maneuvers.8 Radar employs the echo-timing
principle by which distance is measured by the elapsed time between transmission of a radio wave and the receipt of its reflection.0 This particular radar device operates in the following manner:
When a series of waves is sent toward an object which is moving
toward the transmitter, the length of the reflected wave is shorter than
the wave length as measured at the transmitter itself. The greater the
speed of the object, the greater the difference between the frequency of
the transmitted and received wave lengths. The two waves are mixed
in the transmitter and the difference frequency (which tells the speed
of the moving object) is converted so as to be read on a meter calibrated
directly in miles per hour or registered on a graphic recorder.
The reading on the meter must be taken during the short period
that the car remains within range of the speedmeter. The range depends to a great extent on the height of the instrument. On the ground,
the range is from 75 to 100 feet but at a height of three feet, the range
increases to 150 feet. The device is subject to considerable error if
mounted at an angle with the road. While errors due to angularity
are less than 2% at any distance within 15 feet of the traffic path, at
distances between 15 and 25 feet the error may increase to 5%.10
The speedmeter has not been the subject of appellate review," thereSchooley, Pulse Radar History, 31 INSTITUTE OF RADIO ENGINEERS PRoCEED405 (1949).
RADA
'RIDENouR,

INGS

SYSTEM ENGINEERING 14 (1947).

' Shoran, Precision Bombing Aid, Now it Use, 251
564 (1951).

FRANKLIN

INSTITUTE

J.

10 The above was digested from an article, Highway Radar, Radio-Craft, Nov.,
1947, p. 22; for a more detailed and technical explanation, see Barker, Radar

Measures Vehicle Speed, 2 TRAFFIc Q. 239 (1948).
"1A thorough search was made of all state reports since this device was first
marketed, with particular emphasis on those states where information from the
manufacturer indicated the device had been used in prosecuting violators. The
Attorney General of North Carolina, however, has given a ruling on the issue.
In a 1951 opinion, he said: "It would seem that the opinion of an officer based
upon the magic eye apparatus, provided that the magic eye can qualify as a

reliable speed recording instrument, would be no more objectionable than his
opinion based on his speedometer reading." POPULAR GOVERNMENT, June, 1951,
p. 15, col. 3. This, however, seems to beg the question to a large extent as almost
any scientific instrument would surmount objections if it could "qualify as reliable." There is also some doubt that the courts would accept a comparison of
the radar speedmeter with the auto speedometer. The officer reading the auto
speedometer has nothing to do with its accuracy and operation, while the officer
reading the radar device must be trained, not only to read the meter, but to
set up and operate the entire device. He must be able to compute error due to
angularity, if such error be present. Radar is affected by certain weather conditions. See. What Does Rain Do to Radar, 51 AVIATION WEEK 21 (1949). The
officer should know if and to what extent this particular device is affected by
such conditions and be able to compensate for error if there be any. Furthermore,
the auto speedometer itself operates on a very simple mechanical principle that
could hardly be compared with the complex electronic circuits and principles that
combine to make a radar transmitter and receiver.
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fore the admissibility of evidence based upon its operation must be
examined in the light of judicial standards previously set for the use
of other scientific devices. The courts have consistently followed the
rule that evidence obtained from the use of scientific devices is inad12
missible unless there is general scientific recognition of their accuracy.
The reason is that expert testimony based on scientific tests can be very
convincing to a jury, and therefore these tests should be as scientifically
reliable as possible. The courts feel that it is for the scientist to determine the soundness and accuracy of new developments in their
fields.' 3 A scientific principle or discovery must pass from the experimental to the demonstrative stage by gaining general acceptance in the
4
It is
field to which it belongs before it may be admitted in evidence.'
largely because of this rule that evidence obtained by the use of such
5
devices as the lie detector (polygraph) is generally excluded' while
evidence relating to fingerprinting'

6

and ballistics 17 is admitted since it

has been determined by experts that reasonable certainty can follow
such tests. This rule also seems to be the basis for the admissibility of
8
chemical analysis of body fluids to determine intoxication,' while results
of tests made by the "drunkometer" for the same purpose are subject
9
to conflicting decisions as to their probative value.'
",'Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923); State v. Duguid,
50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d
503 (1942); People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (County Ct.
1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis.
651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
"' See State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933); 37 HARv. L.
REV. 1138 (1924).
CARDOZA, LAw AND LITEaRAuRE 70 (1931).
15 Results of lie detector tests were properly excluded from evidence in ab-

sence of general scientific recognition of such tests or reasonable certainty of
results thereof. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; People
v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31; "The case law on this subject is meager,
but the majority hold there is not sufficient scientific recognition of the efficacy
of the polygraph to warrant the judicial acceptance of its recording as evidence

of the truth or falsity of the testimony of the subject witness."

See Cashen,

Admissibility of Evidence as to Results Obtained from Use of Lie Detector, 13
U. DERoIr L. J. 40 (1949). STANSBURY, NORTHr CAROLINA EVIDENCE §86
(1946) ; but see 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §999 (3d ed. 1940), citing some authority

for the admission of such evidence on behalf of the accused.

"8Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288 (1921) ; State v. Conners, 87 N. J. L.
419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915) ; State v. Huffman, 209 N. C. 10, 182 S.E. 705 (1935);

Stacy v. State, 40 Okla. Crim. Rep. 154, 292 P. 885 (1930).
" State v. Quterbridge, 82 N. C. 617 (1880) ; Inbau, Firearms Identificatioll-"Ballistics," 24 J. Cuam. L. 825 (1934).
18 "We have been unable to find any case where the blood test to determine
intoxication has been excluded because of its unreliable value as proof." Kirschwing v. Farrer, 114 Colo. 421, 166 P. 2d 154 (1946); State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz.
276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; the American Medical Association has stated that the
percentage of alcohol in the blood is a reliable index of the degree of intoxication, especially when it is considered along with other external symptoms. 119
J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 653 (1942); but see, Kurokse v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234
Wis. 394, 291 N. W. 384 (1940).
"0 People v. Morse, 35 Mich. 270, 38 N. W. 2d 322 (1949) ; Newman, Proof
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Whether or not the radar speedmeter has received sufficient general
scientific recognition to satisfy the courts remains to be seen. True,
radar as such, has received wide technical acknowledgment in many areas
and is now being successfully used for such purposes as tracking hurricanes20 and guiding aircraft.2 1 However, the fact that the use of radar
is accepted generally for some purposes does not mean that evidence
obtained by its use in connection with measuring speed will be accepted.
Another rule regarding scientific evidence is that such evidence must
be introduced through an expert witness.2 2 The special training necessary to qualify police officers in the operation of the radar speedmeter
is "very slight,

' 23

in some cases only two hours.2 4 It will be interesting

to see if this lack of extensive training, when considered along with
other factors, will qualify an officer as an expert witness in radar.
Evidence obtained by a somewhat similar device has been admitted
in Massachusetts. 2 5 A photographic speed recorder obtained the speed
of a moving car by taking two pictures of it from behind, one picture
about a second later than the other. The second photo was necessarily
smaller than the first since the car had moved through a certain distance
during this interval. Thus by measuring the difference in size of lines
on the two photos, the distance the car travelled during such period and
its speed of travel was readily determined by mathematical formula.23
The acceptance of this device, however, seems to a large extent to have
been based upon the general scientific acceptance of the accuracy of its
component parts and the fact that this court did not require such evidence
27
to be introduced through an expert witness.
Since the speedmeter only clocks speed for a few feet it could not
of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 266 (1946) ; but see, State v. Hunter, 4
N. J. Super. 531, 68 A. 2d 274 (1949), admitting the drunkometer tests but imposing high standards of care in its use. See Note 30 N. C. L. REV. 302 (1952).
"Radar Tracks Hurricanes; Results Promises Aid in System Operation, 133

91 (1950).
"1Radar Landing Systems, 63 AERo

ELEc. WORLD

DIGEST 34 (1951).
2-People v. Fiorita, 339 Ill. 78, 170 N. E. 690 (1930); Conley v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 78, 95 S. W. 2d 1094 (1936) ; but see, Commonwealth v. Buxton,
205 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 128 (1910).
" "The special training necessary to qualify an officer in the operation of the
speedmeter is very slight and can be accomplished in a relatively short period
of time." Letter to writer from Jeter L. Williamson, Chief of Police, Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952.
24 Letter to writer from John M. Gold, City Manager, Winston-Salem, N. C.,
March 26, 1952.
22' Commonwealth v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 128 (1910).
6 Ibid.
" Ibid. State introduces extensive evidence showing the trustworthiness of
the stopwatch mechanism and that of the chronometer, which was part of the
device. As to the rule that such evidence must be introduced through an expert,
the court said: "Nor is the fact that the experimenter was not an expert fatal to
the introduction of the machine. A man may testify to the existence of thunder
and lightning and the disastrous results therefrom without being an expert on
electricity or electrical phenomenon."
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be used for enforcement of speed laws on state highways of New York
or states having similar statutes requiring that a motorist exceed the
speed limit for a specified distance before such excess speed shall be
unlawful. 28 However, the situation was met in Garden City, New
York, where the speedmeter is presently in use, by the passage of a new
ordinance eliminating any specified distance over which speed must be
maintained. 29
Another interesting problem is presented by the method of making
the arrest and the presentation of the evidence. The North Carolina
law forbids an officer to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence. 30 Whether an offense has or
has not been committed "in the presence" of the officer has been the
subject of much litigation. 31 The criteria is that the acts constituting
the offense must become known to the officer through one of his senses
at the time the offense is committed.32 Although some courts have
held this to be too broad and require that the offense become known
through a combination of two or more of the officer's senses,33 there
seems to be a uniform requirement that a criminal offense cannot be
said to have been committed in the presence of an officer unless three
elements are present: one, the officer must not merely be present, he
must know of the offense through his senses; two, the officer must know
of the very acts which make up the offense, not merely acts showing
or evidence indicating that an offense has taken place; and three, he
4
must know of the acts at the time, not become aware of them later.
28 "A rate of speed by a motor vehicle or a motor cycle on any public highway in excess of fifty miles an hour for a distance of one-fourth of a mile, except
where a greater speed is permitted by the state traffic commission, shall be un-

lawful." Consol. Laws of N. Y., Vehicle and Traffic Law, §56(3) (1932).

But

see, People v. Mangini, 194 Misc. 615, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1948), holding that this
statute did not prevent municipalities from enacting valid speed ordinances which

did2not include the one-fourth mile provision.

Address by Hon. Ralph L. Custer, Mayor of Garden City, N. Y., at the
N. Y. State Mayors Conference in Syracuse, June 14, 1949, p. 4.
"Alexander v. Lindsay, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949); MACHEN,
THE LAW oF ARREST 38 (1950).
" For a good discussion of what is "in an officer's presence" see MACHEN,
THE LAW OF ARREST 70 (1950).
" State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 151, 195 N. W. 789, 791 (1923); State v.
Godette, 188 N. C. 497, 125 S. E. 24 (1924) ; but see, Robinson v. Commonwealth,

207 Ky. 53, 268 S. W. 840 (1925), where arrest without a warrant for carrying
a concealed weapon was held valid.

As one of the elements of carrying a con-

cealed weapon is the concealment, how can the offense be seen? The Kentucky

court, however, held that Where an officer saw the imprint of a pistol in the defendant's pocket well enough to know that it was a pistol, it was a crime in the

officer's presence and it was still a concealed weapon because hidden from ordinary
view.
"' The sense of smell was held not enough in itself to indicate to an officer that

a crime was being committed in his presence, United States v. Swain, 15 F. 2d

598 (N. D. Cal. 1926) ; United States v. Di Corvo, 37 F. 2d 124 (D. Conn. 1927);
but see, United States v. Fischer, 38 F. 2d 830 (M. D. Pa. 1930).
" MACHEn, THE LAW OF ARREST 70 (1950).
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Ordinarily, the officer making the arrest in speeding cases is the
officer who personally clocked the speed of the violator and no question
arises as to the offense having been committed in his presence. However, with the use of the speedmeter, the general practice is for the
officer reading the indicator not to pursue an offender. Rather, he relays
by radio the description of the speeding car, with or without the license
number to a second officer who stops the car when it reaches his post
or station.35 This second officer makes the arrest or issues the summons without a warrant and without having witnessed the crime.
. Even here no problem would seem to arise if the second officer only
issues a summons and does not detain the motorist further if the summons is refused, as the issuance of a summons is not an arrest.80 If,
however, the motorist refuses to accept the summons, his arrest by the
officer would seem to be unlawful.
In conclusion it may be said that in the absence of a showing of
general scientific acceptance, appellate courts would probably refuse to
admit testimony founded upon information obtained by the use of the
radar speedmeter. It would also appear that evidence based upon the
device may not be given the probative value conceded to certain other
scientific devices because the limited training course may prevent the
operator from qualifying as an expert witness in radar. Furthermore,
the arrest procedure now generally used in connection with the machine
does not seem to meet the strict requirements of the North Carolina
law of arrest.
J. KENNETH LEE.

Bankruptcy-Discharge of judgments Arising Out of
Automobile Accident Suits
When a money judgment is obtained for damages resulting from an
automobile accident, and the judgment debtor is subsequently declared
bankrupt, a difficult question is frequently presented. Does the judgment survive the bankruptcy proceedings or is the judgment debtor
discharged?
Section 17(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Act' provides that:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, 2 whether allowable in full or in part, except such as
15N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 4; Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News,

Aug. 19, 1951, §4, p. 1, col. 1; personal observation by writer of speedmeter in
actual operation in Greensboro, N. C., and Winston-Salem, N. C.
" MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST 8 (1950).
130 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §35 (Supp. 1951).
2 It must be borne in mind that non-provable claims are never dischargeable.
In order to be provable, a claim arising out of an automobile accident must be
rediced to judgment before the filing bf the petition in bankruptcy, or the action
must be instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §103 (Supp. 1951).

